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Abstract
We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is
coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These so-
called clique games are such that agents are divided into cliques, with
the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number
of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multi-
ple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belong to
their intersection. Finally, if two agents do not belong to the same
clique, there is at most one way to link the two agents through a
chain of agents, with any two non-adjacent agents in the chain be-
longing to disjoint sets of cliques. We provide multiple examples for
clique games. Graph-induced games, either when the graph indicates
cooperation possibilities or impossibilities, provide us with opportu-
nities to confirm existing results or discover new ones. A particular
focus are the minimum cost spanning tree problems. Our result al-
lows us to obtain new correspondence results between the nucleolus
and the Shapley value, as well as other cost sharing methods for the
minimum cost spanning tree problem.
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1 Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the (pre)nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969)
are two well known values for cooperative games. The Shapley value is an
average of the contributions of an agent, while the prenucleolus is the value
that minimizes the dissatisfaction of the worst-off coalitions. The nucleolus
differs from the prenucleolus by only taking into account individually rational
imputations.
Coincidence between the Shapley value and the (pre)nucleolus is uncom-
mon and, in general, difficult to check without computing both values. Re-
cently, Yokote et al. (2017) provide a sufficient and necessary condition for
this coincidence to hold, but it requires the computation of both the Shapley
value and of a parametric family of sets, for which the computation mimics
that of the (pre)nucleolus.1 This characterization can be applied in order
to identify the correspondence in some particular classes of games, such as
airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bidder collusion games (Gra-
ham et al., 1990) and polluted river games (Ni and Wang, 2007). Cso´ka
and Herings (2017) also find coincidence is some three-agent games based on
bankruptcy problems. As discussed by Kar et al. (2009), for general coali-
tional form games we have coincidence if the game only has two agents or
if all agents are symmetric within the normalized game. Some other games
have also been proposed (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994; van den Nouweland
et al., 1996), all having in common that the value of a coalition is equal to
the sum of the values created by the pairs composing that coalition. The co-
incidence persists in games that satisfy the so-called PS property (Kar et al.,
2009). These games are such that the contributions of agent i to any coali-
tion and its complement sum up to an agent-specific constant. A particular
instance of such games is studied by Chun et al. (2016).
Gonza´lez-Dı´az and Sa´nchez-Rodr´ıguez (2014) also study the coincidence
from a geometric point of view. Instead of providing classes of games where
both values coincide, they study the properties that lead to this result in some
1Additionally, the condition also requires to check whether the sets in this parametric
family are balanced.
2
already existing classes, as for example PS-games. A similar, yet different
problem, is the invariance of the payoff assigned by an allocation rule to a
specific player in two related games. See Be´al et al. (2015) for the case of the
Shapley value.
In this paper, we present another family of games, called clique games,
in which the Shapley value and the nucleolus coincide. The family can be
described as follows: the set of agents is divided into cliques that cover it. A
coalition creates value when it contains many agents belonging to the same
clique, with the value increasing linearly with the number of agents in the
same clique. Agents may belong to more than one clique, but the intersection
of two cliques contains at most one agent. Finally, if two agents are not in
the same clique, there exists at most one way to “connect” them through a
chain of connected cliques.
The family of clique games has a non-empty intersection with PS-games,
but some clique games are not PS-games, and some PS-games are not clique
games.
A clique game is convex, and hence its Shapley value is the average of
the extreme points in its core. We thus obtain a link between three crucial
concepts of cooperative game theory: the nucleolus, the core, and the Shapley
value.
Naturally, graph-induced games provide a fertile ground to apply our re-
sult. We first consider the graph-restricted cooperative games introduced by
Myerson (1977). In these games, a coalitional value function is accompa-
nied by a graph that summarizes the cooperation possibilities: a coalition S
cannot fully cooperate if some of its members have no path between them
that uses only the vertices of agents in S. When we consider a symmetric
coalitional value function, assigning shares of the value created among agents
is akin to defining centrality measures (Gomez et al., 2003). We show that
when the coalitional value function increases linearly with the number of
agents in a coalition (starting with the second one) we obtain coincidence
of the Shapley value (known as the Myerson value in this context) and the
nucleolus for a family of graphs.
Another graph-induced game that we study is the minimum coloring game
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(Deng et al., 1999), in which the graph represents conflicts between pairs of
agents. We wish to assign agents to facilities, but cannot assign agents that
are in conflict to the same facility. As facilities all have a cost of one, we
wish to minimize the number of facilities used. Okamoto (2008) noticed a
coincidence between the Shapley value and the nucleolus for a particular
family of graphs. We explain this coincidence by the fact that the graphs
induce clique games.
Our third example is the one we mainly focus on: the minimum cost
spanning tree (mcst) problem (Bird, 1976). This well-studied problem has
agents connecting to a source through a network, with the cost of an edge
being a fixed amount that is paid if the edge is used, regardless of the number
of users of the edge. Any such problem has a non-empty core even though
it may not be convex. Moreover, its Shapley value is not always in its core
(Dutta and Kar, 2004).
Nevertheless, Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) and Trudeau (2012)
propose Shapley value-based solutions that are in the core, by first modifying
the costs of the edges. For any pair of nodes in the network, Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga (2007a) look at the paths going from one to the other and
ranks them according to their most expensive edge. The edge between the
pair of nodes is then assigned the cost of that cheapest most expensive edge,
allowing to obtain the so-called irreducible mcst problem. The Shapley value
of that problem yields the so-called folk solution. The solution proposed by
Trudeau (2012) is similar, but looks at cycles instead of paths, yielding a
cycle-complete mcst problem and the cycle-complete solution.
Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007b) also provide another Shapley value-
based definition of the folk solution, by defining a cost game assuming that
any coalition can connect either to the source or to any other node.
We identify mcst problems that generate clique games. In particular, it
turns out that if we consider elementary mcst problems (in which all edges
have a cost of 0 or 1), which form a basis for all mcst problems, the subset
of cycle-complete problems (which include irreducible problems) generates
clique games. Our result on clique games then applies, yielding that the
nucleolus coincides with the cycle-complete solution for cycle-complete prob-
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lems and with the folk solution for irreducible problems.
We can extend the correspondence one step further: for all elementary
mcst problems, the folk (cycle-complete) solution corresponds to the nucleo-
lus and the permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core
of the public (private) mcst game.
The paper is divided as follows: preliminary definitions are in Section
2. Section 3 describes and illustrates clique games. Section 4 contains the
correspondence results. Applications to graph-induced games are discussed
in Section 5. The application and extension of the results to mcst problems
are described in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a set of agents. A transferable utility game (TU
game, for short) is a pair (N, v) where v is a real-valued function defined on
all subsets S ⊆ N satisfying v(∅) = 0. Given i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}, the
contribution of agent i to S is defined as
∆vi (S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
A game is convex if ∆vi (S) ≤ ∆
v
i (T ) for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i}.
A value is a function that associates with each TU game (N, v) an alloca-
tion x ∈ RN . Two well-known values are the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
and the (pre)nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
The Shapley value of the game (N, v) is the allocation Sh(v) defined as
Shi(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
∆vi (Pi(pi))
for all i ∈ N , where Π is the set of all orderings of N and Pi(pi) is the set of
predecessors of agent i in pi, i.e. Pi(pi) = {j : pi(j) < pi(i)}.
The excess of a coalition S in a TU game (N, v) with respect to an al-
location x is defined as e(S, x, v) =
∑
i∈N xi − v(S). The vector θ(x) is
constructed by rearranging the 2n excesses in (weakly) increasing order. If
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x, y ∈ RN are two allocations, then θ(x) >L θ(y) means that θ(x) is lexi-
cographically larger than θ(y). As usual, we write θ(x) ≥L θ(y) to indicate
that either θ(x) >L θ(y) or x = y.
The nucleolus of the game (N, v) is the set
Nu(v) = {x ∈ X : θ(x) ≥L θ(y)∀y ∈ X}
where X =
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), xi ≥ v({i})∀i ∈ N
}
is the set of in-
dividually rational allocations. When X 6= ∅, as it is the case for the TU
games we study here, it is well-known that Nu(v) is a singleton, whose unique
element we denote, with some abuse of notation, also as Nu(v).
By contrast, the prenucleolus of the game (N, v) is the set
Pre(v) =
{
x ∈ X0 : θ(x) ≥L θ(y)∀y ∈ X
0
}
where X0 =
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)
}
is the set of allocations. Whenever
the prenucleolus is individually rational, which will be the case in all games
that we consider, it coincides with the nucleolus. Therefore, from now on,
we focus exclusively on the nucleolus.
The core is the set of allocations such that no coalition is assigned less
than its stand-alone value. Formally,
Core(v) =
{
x ∈ X0 :
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)∀S ⊂ N
}
.
When Core(v) 6= ∅, for each pi ∈ Π, let ypi ∈ Core(v) be the allocation
that lexicographically maximizes the individual allocations with respect to
the order given by the permutation. The permutation-weighted average of
extreme points of the core is the average of these allocations:
y¯(v) =
∑
pi∈Π(N)
1
n!
ypi(v).
If the game is convex, y¯ is the Shapley value. This average is also closely
related to the “selective value” (Vidal-Puga, 2004) and the “Alexia value”
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(Tijs, 2005). All of these values coincide for the minimum cost spanning tree
problem studied in Section 5.
On some occasions, we work with transferable cost games (N,C), where
C is a real-valued function defined on all subsets S ⊆ N satisfying C(∅) = 0.
We then define vC as follows: For all S ⊆ N , vC(S) =
∑
i∈S C({i})− C(S).
An allocation x for the cost game C is equivalent to an allocation xC for the
TU game vC if xCi = C ({i})−xi for all i ∈ N . We then say that x ∈ Nu(C)
iff xC ∈ Nu
(
vC
)
. We say that x ∈ Core(C) iff xC ∈ Core(vC). Finally, we
say that C is concave iff −C is convex. It is straightforward to check that C
is concave iff vC is convex.
3 Clique games
Let Q =
{
Q1, . . . , QK
}
be a cover of N . For each Qk ∈ Q, the interior of
Qk, Int
(
Qk
)
, is the set of agents who only belong to Qk, i.e.
Int
(
Qk
)
=
{
i ∈ Qk : i /∈ Ql∀l 6= k
}
.
A path between Qk and Ql is a list P kl =
{
Qk1 , . . . , QkM
}
such that Qk1 =
Qk, QkM = Ql and
∣∣Qkm ∩Qkm+1∣∣ = 1 for all m = 1, . . . ,M−1. Analogously,
a path between Qk and Ql through agent i is a list P kli =
{
Qk1 , . . . , QkM
}
such
that Qk1 ∩Qk2 = {i}. The set of agents connected to Qk via a path through
agent i ∈ Qk is denoted as
NPk,i =
{
j ∈ N : ∃l, P kli such that j ∈ Q
l
}
.
Example 1 Let Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3} with Q1 = {1, 2}, Q2 = {2, 3, 4} and
Q3 = {4, 5, 6} (see Figure 1).
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5
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Figure 1: Example of a cover represented as cliques.
In this case, P 132 = {Q
1, Q2, Q3} is a path between Q1 and Q3 through
agent 2. The other paths are P 122 = {Q
1, Q2}, P 212 = {Q
2, Q1}, P 234 =
{Q2, Q3}, P 324 = {Q
3, Q2}, and P 314 = {Q
3, Q2, Q1}. Moreover, NP1,1 = ∅,
NP2,2 = {1, 2}, N
P
1,2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, N
P
2,4 = {4, 5, 6}, and so on.
A game
(
N, vQ
)
is a clique game if there exists Q =
{
Q1, . . . , QK
}
that
covers N , {vi}i∈N ⊂ R+ and {vQ}Q∈Q ⊂ R+ such that:
i) for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} and all i, j ∈ Qk, NPk,i ∩N
P
k,j = ∅ (there is at most
one path between any two elements of Q),
ii) for all S ⊆ N ,
vQ(S) =
∑
i∈S
vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| − 1) vQ (1)
with Q(S) = {Q ∈ Q : S ∩Q 6= ∅}.
We write Q(i) for Q ({i}).
Let C be the set of all clique games.
We conclude this section by proposing an example of a clique game.
Example 2 (Trading goods) The agent set is N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, with 1 and
2 being producers and 3, 4 and 5 being buyers. Producer 1 has a capacity to
produce two units at constant marginal cost c1 while producer 2 can produce
a single unit at cost c2. Each buyer i is interested in a single unit that she
values at Ri. We suppose that these valuations are larger than the marginal
cost of the producers.
Producers 1 and 2 have exclusive territories (because of vertical restraints
or collusion) and buyers 3 and 4 are on the territory of producer 1 and buyer
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5 on the territory of producer 2. The producers’ unused capacity can be sold
to external buyers at price q and buyers have the option of buying from an
external supplier at price p, with Ri > p > q > cj.
When a coalition forms, trades occur between buyers and sellers in the
same territory, with unsatisfied demands and unsold supply resolved on the
outside market. For example, coalition {1, 2, 3, 5} can organize trades be-
tween 1 and 3 and 2 and 5, generating a surplus of R3 + R5 − c1 − c2. In
addition, producer 1 can sell its extra unit on the outside market, generating
an additional surplus of q − c1.
The game can thus be represented (see Figure 2) by a clique game, with
cover Q = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 5}} and v1 = 2q − 2c1, v2 = q − c2,
vi = Ri − p for i = 3, 4, 5, v{1,2} = 0 and vQ = r ≡ p− q otherwise.
1 2
3
4
5
r
r
0 r
Figure 2: Clique cover of a trading goods game.
4 Correspondence between the Shapley value
and the nucleolus
In this section we show that for clique games, the Shapley value and the
nucleolus coincide, and we provide a closed-form expression for their value.
To get to this result, we first calculate the contributions in a clique game.
Lemma 1 Given a clique game (N, vQ), the contribution of agent i ∈ N to
S ⊆ N \ {i} is
∆v
Q
i (S) = vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(i)
vQ.
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Proof. By definition of a contribution,
∆v
Q
i (S) = v
Q(S ∪ {i})− vQ(S)
(1)
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S∪{i})
(|Q ∩ (S ∪ {i})| − 1) vQ −
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| − 1) vQ
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(i)
[(|Q ∩ (S ∪ {i})| − 1)− (|Q ∩ S| − 1)] vQ
+
∑
Q/∈Q(S),i∈Q
(|Q ∩ (S ∪ {i})| − 1) vQ
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(i)
[|Q ∩ S)| − (|Q ∩ S| − 1)] vQ
+
∑
Q/∈Q(S),i∈Q
(|{i}| − 1) vQ
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(i)
vQ.
We are now ready for the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 For all vQ ∈ C and all i ∈ N ,
Shi
(
vQ
)
= y¯i
(
vQ
)
= Nui
(
vQ
)
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(i)
|Q| − 1
|Q|
vQ.
Proof. It is obvious from Lemma 1 that vQ is a convex game. Thus, the
Shapley value is the average of extreme points of the core (Shapley, 1971;
Ichiishi, 1981) and Sh
(
vQ
)
= y¯
(
vQ
)
. We show that for all i ∈ N ,
Shi
(
vQ
)
= Nui
(
vQ
)
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(i)
|Q| − 1
|Q|
vQ.
We suppose that for all k ∈ {1, ..., K},
⋃
i∈Qk N
P
k,i = N \ Int(Q
k), that
is, there is a (unique) path between any two elements of Q. Without that
assumption, we can partition our agents into groups unconnected by paths,
and we can compute the Shapley value and the nucleolus independently on
each component of the partition.
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We start with Sh
(
vQ
)
. Given pi ∈ Π, under Lemma 1, the contribution of
agent i to Pi(pi) is vi+
∑
Q∈Q(Pi(pi))∩Q(i)
vQ. For each Q ∈ Q(i), the probability
that Q ∈ Q (Pi(pi))∩Q(i) is
|Q|−1
|Q|
. Summing up, we obtain the desired result.
We now focus onNu
(
vQ
)
. Let x ∈ RN defined as xi = vi+
∑
Q∈Q(i)
|Q|−1
|Q|
vQ
for all i ∈ N . We have that
e
(
S, x, vQ
)
=
∑
i∈S
vi +
∑
i∈S
∑
Q∈Q(i)
|Q| − 1
|Q|
vQ −
∑
i∈S
vi −
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| − 1) vQ
=
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(
|Q ∩ S| (|Q| − 1)
|Q|
− (|Q ∩ S| − 1)
)
vQ
=
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| (|Q| − 1)− |Q ∩ S| − 1) |Q|
|Q|
vQ
=
∑
Q∈Q(S)
|Q| − |Q ∩ S|
|Q|
vQ
for all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. Assume without loss of generality
v
Q1
|Q1|
≤
v
Q2
|Q2|
≤ · · · ≤
v
QK
|QK |
.
For each i ∈ Q1, let S1i = N \
(
NP1,i ∪ {i}
)
. Note that for all Q ∈ Q\{Q1},
either S1i ∩ Q = ∅ or S
1
i ∩ Q = Q. In addition, S
1
i ∩ Q
1 = Q1 \ {i}. Thus,
e
(
S1i , x, v
Q
)
=
v
Q1
|Q1|
. By construction, this is the lowest excess value. To see
why, note that any S ⊂ N has at least one Q ∈ Q (S) such that |Q∩S| < |Q|.
That generates an excess of |Q|−|Q∩S|
|Q|
vQ ≥
vQ
|Q|
≥
v
Q1
|Q1|
.
For each i ∈ Q1, let T 1i = N
P
1,i ∪ {i} = N \ S
1
i . Take {T
1
i }i∈Q1 . This
is a partition of N . To see why, note that each T 1i is nonemtpy (because
i ∈ T 1i for all i ∈ Q
i), their union is N (because all cliques are connected
through a path), and they are pairwise disjoint (because of assumption i)).
Thus, we have |Q1| coalitions whose complements have the minimal excess,
with each agent belonging to exactly one of of these coalitions. Therefore,
to increase the excess of one of these coalitions we would need to decrease
the excess of another coalition, and the corresponding allocation could not
be the nucleolus.
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We repeat the process for all Qk to obtain that
∑
j∈Ski
Nuj
(
vQ
)
=
∑
j∈Ski
xj (2)
for all Qk ∈ Q and all i ∈ Qk. In case i ∈ Int(Qk) for some k ∈ {1, ..., K}, we
have Ski = N \ {i}, from where (2) and efficiency of x imply Nui
(
vQ
)
= xi.
In case Q = {Q1}, we have N = Int (Q1) and hence Nu
(
vQ
)
= x. So,
we assume |Q| > 1. From condition i) in the definition of clique games, there
exist some i ∈ N and Qk ∈ Q(i) such that Q = Int(Q) ∪ {i} for all Q ∈
Q(i) \ {Qk}. This implies that Nuj
(
vQ
)
= xj for all j ∈ Q
k ∈ Q(i) \ {Qk}.
Under (2) and the efficiency of x, we deduce Nui
(
vQ
)
= xi. Repeating
the reasoning, we can always find a new i ∈ N and Qk ∈ Q(i) such that
Nuj
(
vQ
)
= xj for all j ∈ Q
k ∈ Q(i) \ {Qk}, so that (2) and the efficiency of
x imply Nui
(
vQ
)
= xi, and so on until we get Nu
(
vQ
)
= x.
We next establish the connection between clique games and the PS-games
of Kar et al. (2009). We say that a game (N, v) is a PS-game if there
exists a ∈ RN such that ∆vi (S) + ∆
v
i (N \ (S ∪ {i})) = ai for all i ∈ N and
S ⊆ N \ {i}.
We show the condition needed for a clique game to be a PS-game, which
illustrates that not all clique games are PS-games.
Proposition 1 A clique game vQ is a PS-game if and only if for all Q ∈ Q
either |Q| ≤ 2 or vQ = 0.
Proof. Under Lemma 1, for any clique game vQ, we have that
∆v
Q
i (S) = vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(i)
vQ
and thus ∆v
Q
i (S) + ∆
vQ
i (N \ (S ∪ {i}))
= vi +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(i)
vQ + vi +
∑
Q∈Q(N\(S∪i))∩Q(i)
vQ
= 2vi +
∑
Q∈Q(N\{i})∩Q(i)
vQ +
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(N\(S∪{i}))∩Q(i)
vQ.
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Hence, vQ is a PS-game if and only there exists b ∈ RN such that
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(N\(S∪{i}))∩Q(i)
vQ = bi
for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. In this case, ai = 2vi +
∑
Q∈Q(N\{i})∩Q(i) vQ + bi for all
i ∈ N .
Fix i ∈ N . Let S ⊆ N \ {i} and Q ∈ Q(S) ∩ Q (N \ (S ∪ {i})) ∩ Q(i).
If |Q| ≤ 2 then |Q ∩ S| ≤ 1 (because i ∈ Q and i /∈ S). Since Q ∈ Q(S),
we deduce Q ∩ S = {j} for some j 6= i. Thus, Q = {i, j} ⊆ S ∪ {i}, which
contradicts that Q ∈ Q (N \ (S ∪ {i})). Hence, Q(S) ∩ Q (N \ (S ∪ i)) ∩
Q(i) ⊆ {Q ∈ Q : |Q| > 2}.
From this, we deduce that if vQ = 0 for all Q ∈ Q such that |Q| > 2,
then bi = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Suppose now that there exists Q ∈ Q such that |Q| > 2 and vQ > 0. Fix
i ∈ Q. If S = ∅ we obtain
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(N\(S∪i))∩Q(i) vQ = 0 (as Q(S) = ∅).
If S = {j}, j ∈ Q \ {i}, we obtain
∑
Q∈Q(S)∩Q(N\(S∪i))∩Q(i) vQ ≥ vQ > 0 (as
Q ∈ Q(S) ∩ Q (N \ (S ∪ {i})) ∩ Q(i)) .
Moreover, not all PS games are clique games, as the next example shows:
Example 3 (Example 3.12 in Kar et al. (2009)) We consider the TU
game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and such that v(S) = 0 if |S| = 1, 1 if
|S| = 2, 3
2
if |S| = 3, and 3 if S = N . This is a PS game with ∆vi (S) +
∆vi (N \ (S ∪ {i})) =
3
2
for all i and S. However, it is not a clique game.
To see this, notice that v(S) = 0 if |S| = 1 implies that vi = 0 for all
i ∈ N . Then, v(S) = 1 if |S| = 2 implies that any pair i, j belong to some
clique Q with vQ = 1. The no-cycle condition of clique games (condition i))
leaves us with a single candidate for the set of cliques: Q = {N}. But then
v(S) = |S| − 1 for all S, which is different from the PS-game for |S| = 3.
5 Graph-induced games
We apply our result to two families of games that represent cooperation
possibilities or impossibilities on a graph. We need the following graph theory
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definitions.
We now interpret N as a set of vertices, and say that a graph on N is
a set of unordered pairs of distinct members of N. Let GN be the complete
graph: GN = {(i, j) |i, j ∈ N, i 6= j } . A graph G is a subset of GN . For any
S ⊆ N, G[S] is the subgraph of G induced by S.
Suppose S ⊆ N, G ⊆ GN , i, j ∈ N. We say that i and j are connected
in S by G iff there is a path in G which goes from i to j and stays within
S. That is, there is some k ≥ 1 and a sequence i0, i1, ..., ik such that i0 = i,
ik = j and (il−1, il) ∈ G[S] for all l = 1, ..., k. A coalition T is connected in S
by G if i and j are connected in S by G, for all i, j ∈ T. If S is connected by
S in G, we simply say that S is connected by G. We say that a connected
coalition T in S is maximal if there does not exist a coalition T ′ ⊃ T that is
connected in S by G.
We say that a graph G is a clique graph if there exists Q, a cover of N
with Q =
{
Q1, ..., QK
}
such that for all k = 1, ..., K, Qk is connected by G.
In addition, a clique graph G is said to be acyclical if for all i, j such that
there does not exists Qk ⊇ {i, j} , there exists at most a single path between
them: there does not exist S such that i and j are connected in both S and
N\S by G.
We say that a clique graph is disjointed if for all i ∈ N, |Q(i)| = 1. It is
obvious that a disjointed clique graph is also acyclical.
Let GC = GN\G be the complement of graph G.
5.1 Graph-restricted cooperative game
We consider the graph-restricted cooperation game introduced by Myerson
(1977), in which a coalition of agents can cooperate together only if its mem-
bers are connected.
More precisely, every graph G partitions every coalition S into a set of
maximal connected subcoalitions, PS in a natural way.
Let V ∈ R2
N
+ be a coalition function. A graph restricted problem is
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(G, V ). The graph restricted game VG is then defined by
VG(S) =
∑
T∈PS
V (T ).
In words, V represents the values obtained by each coalition if all of its
members can cooperate. But, in practice, cooperation within a coalition
might reduce to cooperation among subcoalitions, so that a coalition S fails
to extract all of its potential value V (S).
While any value function can be used, symmetric functions eliminate the
differences coming from the game V , allowing to focus on the graph, thus
defining a centrality measure (Gomez et al., 2003). Gonzalez-Aranguena
et al. (2017) use a family of symmetric functions V k that forms a basis for
all symmetric functions: for k = 1, ..., n, S ⊆ N and a > 0
V k(S) =
{
0 if |S| = 0, ..., k − 1;(
|S|
k
)
a otherwise.
For coalition S the function V k assigns a value of a for every group of k
members it contains. Given that these games are meant to represent com-
munication opportunities between members, it is natural to make sure that
a single agent cannot generate value by himself (Gonzalez-Aranguena et al.,
2017). It is the case for all function V k except V 1, that we zero-normalize:
V 1
∗
(∅) = 0 and V 1
∗
(S) = V 1(S) − a for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . Then, in V 1
∗
,
a coalition receives a value of a for each of its members, starting with the
second one.
Theorem 2 Let G be an acyclical clique graph. Then, for all i ∈ S,
Shi(V
1∗
G ) = Nui(V
1∗
G ) =
∑
Q∈Q(i)
|Q| − 1
|Q|
a.
Proof. It is not difficult to see that the combination of the acyclical clique
graph and the properties of V 1
∗
gives rise to a clique game, in which vi = 0
for all i ∈ N and vQ = a for all cliques Q. The result then follows from
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Theorem 1.
As both the Shapley value (known as the Myerson value in this context)
and the nucleolus (Montero, 2013) have been proposed as centrality or power
indexes, the result above allows to understand when they coincide.
5.2 Minimum coloring game
We now consider a model in which the graph represents conflict situations.
Agents have to be placed in facilities, but there is potential conflict be-
tween individuals. If two agents are in conflict, they cannot be put in the
same facility. We are trying to find the minimum number of facilities needed
to locate all individuals in N . We assume that facilities cost 1 unit each.
Conflicts are represented in graph G: If (i, j) ∈ G, then agents i and j
are in conflict. The problem is known as the minimum coloring game, as we
attempt to assign colors to all vertices (agents) in the graph, with different
colors for agents in conflict, all while using the minimum number of colors
(Deng et al., 1999).
For all S ⊆ N, let cMCG (S) be the minimum number of facilities to locate
all members of S, given conflict subgraph G[S].
Theorem 3 (Okamoto, 2008) If GC is a disjointed clique graph, then, for
all i ∈ N ,
Shi(c
MC
G ) = Nui(c
MC
G ) =
1
|Qi|
where Qi is the only clique that agent i belongs to.
While Okamoto (2008) notices the coincidence between the Shapley value
and the nucleolus, no explanation is provided. It is obvious that if GC is a
disjointed clique graph, we obtain (once we transform the game into a value
game) a clique game in which vi = 0 for all i ∈ N and vQ = 1 for all cliques
Q. Therefore, we now have an explanation on why we have this coincidence.
We can also be pessimistic about coincidence on a larger set of minimum
coloring games, as if an agent belongs to multiple cliques, we do not obtain
the linear form of value creation needed for a clique game.
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6 Minimum cost spanning tree problems
In this section we describe the minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problem,
showing that an important subset of such games are also clique games. In
turn, this allows us to link the nucleolus to some well-known cost sharing
solutions for mcst problems.
6.1 The problem
We assume that the agents in N need to be connected to a source, denoted
by 0. Let N0 = N ∪ {0}. For any set Z, define Z
p as the set of all non-
ordered pairs (i, j) of elements of Z. In our context, any element (i, j) of Zp
represents the edge between nodes i and j. Let c = (ce)e∈Np
0
be a vector in
R
Np
0
+ with N
p
0 = (N0)
p and ce ∈ R+ representing the cost of edge e. Let Γ be
the set of all cost vectors. Since c assigns cost to all edges, we often abuse
language and call c a cost matrix. A mcst problem is a triple (0, N, c). Since
0 and N do not change, we omit them in the following and simply identify a
mcst problem (0, N, c) by its cost matrix c.
A cycle pll is a set of K ≥ 3 edges (ik−1, ik), with k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and
such that i0 = iK = l and i1, . . . , iK−1 distinct and different from l. A path
plm between l and m is a set of K edges (ik−1, ik), with k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
containing no cycle and such that i0 = l and iK = m. Let Plm(N0) be the
set of all paths between nodes l and m.
A spanning tree is a non-orientated graph without cycles that connects
all elements of N0. A spanning tree t is identified by the set of its edges.
We call mcst a spanning tree that has minimal cost. Note that a mcst
might not be unique. Let C(N, c) be the minimal cost of a mcst. Let cS be
the restriction of the cost matrix c to S0 ⊆ N0. Let C(S, c) be the cost of the
mcst of the problem (S, cS). We say that C is the stand-alone cost function
associated with c.
For any cost matrix c, the associated cost game is given by (N,C) with
C(S) = C(S, c) for all S ⊆ N . We then write, with some abuse of notation,
(N, c) instead of (N,C) and say that it is a mcst game.
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A variant of the mcst problem, called the public mcst problem, allows
any coalition to use all nodes, including those belonging to agents outside of
the coalition, to connect to the source. The public cost function associated
with c is defined as
CPub(S, c) = min
T⊆N\S
C(S ∪ T, c)
for all S ⊆ N . By contrast, we sometimes call (N, c) the private cost function
associated with c and the mcst problem the private mcst problem.
Abusing language slightly, we use the term mcst game to designate the
cost game generated by a mcst problem.
6.2 The irreducible and cycle-complete cost matrices
The Shapley value of a mcst game iis not always in the core, given that the
mcst game is typically not concave. The following two modifications to the
problem allow to transform the game into a concave one.
From any cost matrix c, we define the irreducible cost matrix c∗ as follows:
c∗ij = min
pij∈Pij(N0)
max
e∈pij
ce
for all i, j ∈ N0.
From any cost matrix c, we define the cycle-complete cost matrix c∗∗ as
follows:
c∗∗ij = max
k∈N\{i,j}
(
cN\{k}
)∗
ij
for all i, j ∈ N0, and
c∗∗0i = max
k∈N\{i}
(
cN\{k}
)∗
0i
for all i ∈ N , where
(
cN\{k}
)∗
indicates the matrix that is first restricted to
agents in N \ {k} before being transformed into an irreducible matrix.
The cycle complete matrix can also be defined using cycles (Trudeau,
2012): for edge (i, j), we look at cycles that go through agents i and j. If
there is one such cycle such that its most expensive edge is cheaper than a
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direct connection on edge (i, j), we assign this cost to edge (i, j).
Let C∗ be the characteristic cost function associated with the mcst prob-
lem (N, c∗). Let C∗∗ be the characteristic cost function associated with the
mcst problem (N, c∗∗). The Shapley values of C∗ and C∗∗ are respectively
called the folk (yf (c)) and cycle-complete (ycc(c)) solutions.
When a coalition builds its mcst, it connects one member of each clique
to the source. The condition that agents of different cliques have no benefit
in cooperating allows for the value creation to occur only when members
of the same clique cooperate. The conditions on the cost of edges between
members of a clique and between them and the source guarantee that the
value creation increases by a constant for each additional member of a clique
that cooperates, starting with the second one.
6.3 Minimum cost spanning tree games and clique games
For a mcst game to also be a clique game, we need members of a clique to
have the same cost to connect to each other (condition a below), members
of different cliques to have no gain in cooperating (condition b) and within a
clique, there exists either one or two different costs to connect to the source.
In that second case, a single agent has the low cost (condition c).
Lemma 2 A mcst game (N, c) is associated to a clique game if and only if
there exist Q satisfying condition i) of clique games and {cQ}Q∈Q ⊂ R that
satisfy the following conditions:
a) cij = cQ for all Q ∈ Q and all i, j ∈ Q;
b) cij ≥ max {c0i, c0j} for all i, j ∈ N such that there exists no Q ∈ Q
with i, j ∈ Q;
c) for all Q ∈ Q, if cmin0,Q , cQ < c
max
0,Q then |argmaxj∈Q c0j| = |Q| − 1, where
cmax0,Q = maxj∈Q c0j and c
min
0,Q = minj∈Q c0j.
Proof. Note first that condition b can be replaced by:
b′) cij = max {c0i, c0j} for all i, j ∈ N such that there exists no Q ∈ Q
with i, j ∈ Q.
19
To see why, notice that an edge (i, j) with cij > max {c0i, c0j} is irrelevant in
the sense that it does not affect the cost function C. Hence, the associated
game (N, vC) does not change if we reduce cij until equality holds. We
then assume that c has no irrelevant edges. This also implies that cQ ≤
max {c0i, c0j} for all Q ∈ Q and all i, j ∈ Q.
We first show that the conditions generate a clique game. Suppose that
we want to connect members of S to the source. Conditions a and b′ make it
never optimal to directly connect members of different cliques. Combination
of the three conditions make it always better to connect members of the same
clique to each other. Let {S1, S2, . . . , SK} be a partition of S such that if
i, j ∈ Sk, then there exists a path between nodes i and j for which the most
expensive edge is cQ, for some Q ∈ Q. Then, the cost of coalition S is
C(S, c) =
K∑
k=1
min
i∈Sk
c0i +
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| − 1) cQ.
Under condition c, if members of a clique have different costs to connect to
the source, then all but one have the same high cost cmax0,Q . We can thus
simplify the cost of coalition S to
C(S, c) =
∑
i∈S
c0i +
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| − 1) (cQ − c
max
0,Q ).
We then have that vC is such that
vC(S, c) =
∑
Q∈Q(S)
(|Q ∩ S| − 1) (cmax0,Q − cQ)
which corresponds to a clique game with vi = 0 for all i ∈ N and vQ =
cmax0,Q − cQ.
We next show that these conditions are necessary. Without condition a,
there exist i, j, k ∈ Q such that cij 6= cQ but cik = cQ. Then, C({i, j} , c) =
min{c0i, c0j}+cij, C({i, k} , c) = min{c0i, c0k}+cQ and C is no longer a clique
game. Without condition b, there exist i, j belonging to different cliques such
that cij < max {c0i, c0j}. Then C({i, j} , c) = min {c0i, c0j}+ cij and C is no
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longer a clique game.
Without condition c, there exists a clique Q containing m ≥ 3 agents
and such that |argmaxj∈Q c0j| < m− 1. There are thus at least two agents,
say i and j, with cmin0,Q ≡ c0i ≤ c0j < c
max
0,Q . Then, C({i, j} , c) = c0i + cQ <
c0i + c0j + (cQ − c
max
0,Q ) and C is no longer a clique game.
Let Γc be the set of matrices generating clique mcst problems.
Consider the subset of mcst problems known as elementary mcst (emcst)
problems: for any i, j ∈ N0, cij ∈ {0, 1}. Let Γ
e be the set of elementary cost
problems.
It turns out that the intersection of clique and elementary mcst problems
is the set of elementary cycle-complete problems,
Lemma 3 Γc ∩ Γe = Γecc, the set of elementary cycle-complete problems.
Proof. “⊇” We need to show that elementary and cycle-complete mcst
games are clique games. By definition, there exists a cover Q of N that
satisfies condition i) of clique games and such that cij = 0 if i, j ∈ Q and
cij = 1 otherwise. Thus, cQ = 0 for all Q ∈ Q and conditions a) and b)
of Lemma 2 are satisfied. Elementary cycle-complete matrices are such that
for each Q ∈ Q, either all members of Q have a cost of zero to connect to
the source, all members of Q have a cost of one to connect to the source, or
a single agent in Q has a cost of zero, with others having a cost of one to
connect to the source. Otherwise, if agents i and j have a cost of zero, but
not k, there are multiple paths of cost zero between the source and k. From
this, condition c) of Lemma 2 only applies when a single agent in Q has a
cost of zero, with others having a cost of one to connect to the source, so
that |argmaxj∈Q c0j| = |{j ∈ Q : cj0 = 1}| = |Q| − 1.
“⊆” Let c ∈ Γc ∩ Γe. Assume c is not cycle-complete. Then, for some
i, j ∈ N0, we have that cij = 1 but there exist two distinct free paths between
them. If i, j ∈ N , we cannot buildQ that satisfies condition i) of clique games
and conditions a) and b) in Lemma 2. If j = 0, we can assume that each
node k in these paths but two (one in each path) satisfy ck0 = 1. Let i
0 and
i1 be the nodes with ci00 = ci10 = 0. We also assume that cαβ = 0 for all
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α, β ∈ N in the path (otherwise, we would be in the previous case). We have
the following possibilities:
1. Both paths are contained in the same clique Q ∈ Q. Then, condition
c) in Lemma 2 implies |argmaxj∈Q c0j| = |Q| − 1 and hence all nodes
in Q but one should have cost 1 to the source. But there are two nodes
(i0 and i1) with cost zero to the source, which is a contradiction.
2. There exist two consecutive nodes α, β ∈ N that belong to different
cliques. Since cαβ = 0 and max{cα0, cβ0} = 1, condition b) in Lemma
2 does not hold, which is a contradiction.
3. There exists a path of at least two cliques between i0 and i1. Clearly,
each of these cliques should have at least two consecutive nodes. More-
over, condition i) of clique games implies that i0 and i1 belong to differ-
ent cliques. Thus, there exist j0 ∈ N consecutive node to i0 and such
that i0, j0 ∈ Q0 and i1 ∈ Q1 with Q0, Q1 different cliques. Condition
b) in Lemma 2 implies that 0 = cj0i1 ≥ max{c0j0 , c0i1} = 1, which is a
contradiction.
We then have that, in any mcst problem whose cost matrix is elementary
and cycle complete, the (pre)nucleolus, the Shapley value, the permutation-
weighted average of the extreme points of the core and the cycle-complete
rule coincide. Formally:
Theorem 4 For all c ∈ Γecc, Nu(C) = Sh(C) = y¯(C) = ycc(c).
Proof. The correspondence between the nucleolus, the Shapley value and the
permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core is obtained
as a corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3. Correspondence with the cycle-
complete solution is by definition.
In addition, as soon as the cost matrix is elementary, the (pre)nucleolus,
the permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core, and the
cycle-complete rule coincide. Formally:
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Theorem 5 For all c ∈ Γe, Nu(C) = y¯(C) = ycc(c).
Proof. Correspondence between the cycle-complete solution and y¯ is shown
in Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2017). We show the correspondence between
the nucleolus and the cycle-complete solution. It is immediate that C∗∗ ≤ C.
We show that if C∗∗(S) < C(S), then the excess of coalition S is ignored in
the calculation of Nu(C∗∗).
As shown in Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2017), there exists T ⊆ N \S such
that C∗∗(S) = C(S ∪ T ) +C(N \ T )−C(N) < C(S). This can we rewritten
as
∑
i∈S∪T
C(i)− C(S ∪ T ) +
∑
i∈N\T
C(i)− C(N \ T )−
∑
i∈N
C(i) + C(N) >
∑
i∈S
C(i)− C(S)
vC(S ∪ T ) + vC(N \ T )− vC(N) > vc(S)
x(S ∪ T )− vC(S ∪ T ) + x(N \ T )− vC(N \ T )− x(N) + vC(N) < x(S)− vC(S)
e(S ∪ T, x, vC) + e(N \ T, x, vC)− e(N, x, vC) < e(S, x, vC)
e(S ∪ T, x, vC) + e(N \ T, x, vC) < e(S, x, vC).
Therefore, the excess of S is not taken into account when we find Nu(C).
We also have that
C∗∗(S ∪ T ) + C∗∗(N \ T )− C∗∗(N) ≤ C(S ∪ T ) + C(N \ T )− C(N) = C∗∗(S)
leading to conclude, in the same manner as above, that
e(S ∪ T, x, C∗∗) + e(N \ T, x, C∗∗) ≤ e(S, x, C∗∗)
and thus that the excess of S is not taken into account when we find Nu(C∗∗).
Therefore, Nu(C) and Nu(C∗∗) depend on the same excesses, and Nu(C) =
Nu(C∗∗). Since Nu(C∗∗) = ycc(c), we also have Nu(C) = ycc(c).
If we look at public mcst games instead of private mcst games, we obtain
similar correspondence results. First, we consider the subset of elementary
irreducible games, for which CPub = C. We have a correspondence between
the (pre)nucleolus, the Shapley value, the permutation-weighted average of
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the extreme points of the core and the folk solution.2
Corollary 1 For all elementary and irreducible matrices c, Nu(C) = Sh(C) =
y¯(C) = yf (c).
For elementary mcst games, for which CPub is typically different from C,
we obtain the following result:
Theorem 6 For all c ∈ Γe, Nu
(
CPub
)
= y¯
(
CPub
)
= yf (c).
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5 and is omitted.
mcst
emcst
Nu(C) = ycc(c) = y(C)
Nu
(
CPub
)
= yf (c)
= y
(
CPub
)
clique-mcst
Nu(C) = Sh(C)
cycle-complete emcst
Nu(C) = Sh(C) = ycc(c) = y(C)
irreducible emcst
C = CPub
Nu(C) = Sh(C) = yf (c) = y(C)
Figure 3: Summary of the results for mcst problems.
The results of this section are summarized in Figure 3. The set of clique-
mcst games are those described in Subsection 5.2.
2A related result is provided by Subiza et al. (2016). They provide a closed-form
solution for the folk solution in a class of mcst games that are a subset of clique games
in which links between agents have a cost that is either high or low. Their result is a
simplification of our closed-form expression for their family. They extend by considering
games in which the set of agents can be partitioned in independent groups, such that they
can all be connected separately to the source, applying their conditions on every group.
One could do the same thing in our setting.
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